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Abstract
Embedded security is nowadays a hot topic. With the arrival of Inter-
net of Things and the increasing demand of connectivity for embedded sys-
tems in many industrial markets, including automotive systems, security
has become an important factor in product design. This thesis is aimed
to test the security capabilities of automotive electronic devices, using
physical attacks known as fault injection. Although other industries have
been using countermeasures against physical attacks for decades, these
are rarely used in automotive embedded systems. Automotive industry
efforts have been focused in improving safety and reliability (e.g. ISO
26262 ASIL certification) instead of security. Previous research proved
the risk of fault injection attacks on automotive SoCs, but these works
were limited to small testing applications running on evaluation boards
and not real automotive systems. The current work aims to assess the se-
curity of off-the-shelf automotive systems running real applications. More
specifically, fault injection attacks are used to bypass the authentication
mechanism of the Unified Diagnostic System (ISO 14229) present in two
different commercial car dashboards. The findings are exposed in order
to suggest design improvements and recommendations for a more secure
automotive embedded systems and SoCs.
Keywords - Fault Injection; Automotive; ECU; UDS; ISO
14229
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1 Introduction
Vehicles have changed considerably in the last decades. Automotive design is
abandoning traditional mechanical solutions for newer electronic based solu-
tions. Modern cars include all type of electronic systems implementing a wide
variety of functionalities, from switching lights to control the injection of fuel in
the engine. These electronic systems have great advantages and they make pos-
sible to design more efficient, more comfortable and safer cars. With a notable
increase in the number of electronic controllers in vehicles, electronic design is
nowadays an important stage on automotive industry.
Electronic design has many aspects to consider in its work-flow. Every design
has a certain purpose in mind, usually in terms of performance, power saving
and cost. In industrial and some consumer designs, reliability is a critical aspect
to consider. Reliability is specially important when a malfunction on the design
may lead to a dangerous and harmful situation. It is not hard to see why an
automotive design would have strict reliability requirements: malfunctions in a
critical electronic system of a car can put in risk the car passengers and other
people in the car surroundings.
Along with the reliability requirements, there is another aspect in electronic
design that is less known and not frequently considered: security. Designs with
security in scope have protection from undesired modifications and accesses
that may as well lead to a undesired or dangerous situation. A poor security
automotive electronic design may be exposed to attacks that may lead to severe
consequences:
• Firmware extraction: this implies the extraction of the program running
in the digital system, which may contain proprietary technologies, an im-
portant asset for manufacturers, leading to industrial espionage and unfair
competitive edge. The analysis of the extracted firmware can reveal also
exploitable vulnerabilities that the attacker may use to compromise the
system in a different way. For example, a vulnerability found in a cryp-
tographic function from the system, discovered using firmware extraction
and analysis, could lead to an exploit that would allow an attacker to
unlock the doors of the car without the genuine keys.
• Firmware modification: after a firmware extraction attackers could make
a firmware modifications. Applying patches to the firmware of a automo-
tive electronic controller is one of the objective of a car tuner attacker,
motivated by a possible increase of performance in the vehicle by altering
the software. These modifications are a great risk to the integrity of the
car and could potentially lead to accidents. Furthermore, it is possible to
modify the software of a car controller intentionally and inflict damage to
the vehicle and its occupants by the means of sabotage.
• Runtime control and access to debug interfaces: these are usually inter-
mediate steps in the way to the previously mentioned situations. Hav-
ing runtime control and access to debug interfaces could also help in the
firmware download, analysis and modification. Having a running target
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is very helpful in order to reverse engineer a firmware image, and also to
develop patches and modifications.
Along with this scenarios, other security related issues may happen. An
example of this is the violation of passenger’s privacy, as an attacker could com-
promise the convenience system in which the hands-free phone call system is
built in, listening to the phone calls made or answered from the car, or even
listening what the car microphone is recording. Moreover, an attacker could
target the GPS navigation system and track a given vehicle, gathering precious
information about the passengers’ location.
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
The objective of the present work is to assess the security of automotive sys-
tems using fault injection (FI) techniques. Academic research regarding fault
injection in automotive systems with security implications in scope is almost
nonexistent. Previous work regarding security in automotive hardware make
use of FI to unlock access to debug interfaces [1] and then compromise the
system. Nevertheless, these experiments are performed under laboratory con-
ditions, commonly using a development board as targets, whereas the present
work uses commercially available electronic control units (ECUs) as targets.
The present work aims to discern whether Fault Injection attacks are feasi-
ble or not in commercially available out-of-the-shelf electronic control units used
in nowadays vehicles. For that purpose, the diagnostic services commonly inte-
grated in the ECUs are used. These services are used to obtain the current status
of a vehicle and the issues that the electronic system may have self-diagnosed.
Diagnostic services are often used also for upgrade and update the firmwares
running in the vehicle electronic controllers. Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS,
see Appendix A) is a common specification for diagnostic services, present in
most modern vehicles. UDS specifies services for firmware upgrading, security
access and other security-critical aspects of vehicle diagnostic. This fact makes
UDS an excellent target application for assessing the security of automotive
controllers by means of fault injection, as bypassing the security measures im-
plemented for UDS using FI techniques could lead to compromise the controller
itself.
Lastly, the task organization for this thesis is shown in Figure 1. The initial
task list is included, along with some subtask that were defined and added later.
The duration of the tasks has been updated to match the final time investment,
as no previsions for their duration were made beforehand.
1.2 About Riscure BV
This thesis was developed in collaboration with Riscure BV. Riscure is an in-
dependent security test laboratory specializing in security testing of products
based on smart card and embedded technology. Riscure evaluates the security
of chip technology and embedded/connected devices that are meant to oper-
ate securely in any environment. We are the leading security test lab for chips
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Figure 1: Gantt chart.
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and set-top boxes deployed in the pay-TV industry. Riscure is also interna-
tional market leader in providing test equipment for side channel robustness
of chip technology. Riscure laboratory equipment is used by chip manufactur-
ers, government agencies and security test laboratories around the world. In
order to achieve the main objectives, it is needed experience and background
in automotive embedded systems, along with deep knowledge in fault injection
techniques and adequate equipment to perform experiments, and Riscure pro-
vided the needed experience, supervision and support during the research.
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2 State of the Art
This section will discuss the techniques known as Side Channel Attacks, used
in this work to assess the security of complex electronic automotive systems.
2.1 Side Channels
When evaluating a secure application, even when the application itself is con-
sidered secure, the implementation of it is not implied to be secure. The way
an application is implemented on a device can make it vulnerable. Side channel
attacks rely on physical aspects of the implementation, instead of theoretical
vulnerabilities of the implemented application itself. The name of side channel
is given because of the use of unintended physical channels, intrinsic to the im-
plementation, to interact with the application itself. Different ways of exploiting
the implementation aspects of a target have been proposed in [2].
In [3] there are described two common criteria to categorize these attacks.
The first criterion is whether the attack is passive or active:
• Passive attacks: In this kind of attack, the device under attack runs mostly
or entirely under normal circumstances. The device is compromised by
observing physical properties of the device operation (e.g. execution time,
power consumption, electromagnetic emissions).
• Active attacks: In these attacks the device, its inputs, and/or its environ-
ment are manipulated in a way such the device behave abnormally. The
device is then compromised exploiting undefined or undesired behavior.
The second criterion for categorizing SCA is the interface used to attack the
device. A device may have several interfaces, logical or physical. Based on the
interface used and the easiness to access it, it is possible to distinguish between
invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks:
• Invasive attacks: In these kind of attacks there is essentially no limit in
terms of interfacing and exploiting. Invasive attacks typically start with
the decapsulation of the device, and followed with high technology passive
or active techniques.
Among the passive invasive attacks, microprobing is one of the most com-
mon. Invasive active techniques worth mentioning are modifications using
laser cutters or focused ion beams.
The equipment needed for this attack is expensive, and they are rarely
performed.
• Semi-Invasive attacks: In these attacks, the target device is usually also
decapsulated, but in contrast with invasive attacks, in semi-invasive at-
tacks no direct electrical contact is made.
Passive semi-invasive attacks are usually related with reading memory cells
without probing. Active semi-invasive attacks are intended to introduce
faults in the device using electromagnetic fields or light.
These attacks typically do not require equipment as expensive as invasive
attacks, but the effort and time needed to conduct them are relatively
high.
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• Non-Invasive attacks: In these kind of attacks the device is attacked as is,
without modification and exploiting only the directly accessible interfaces.
Passive non-invasive attacks are usually known as side-channel analysis,
and the most popular types are timing analysis attacks, power analysis at-
tacks and electromagnetic (EM) analysis attacks. The idea behind these
techniques is to compromise a device by measuring its execution time,
its power consumption or its electromagnetic emissions, relating the mea-
sured traces to the operation running in the target. On the other hand,
active non-invasive attacks are frequently known as fault injection (FI)
attacks. The main objective for FI attacks is to introduce a fault into a
device that results in unexpected or undesired behavior without the need
of heavily modify the target. The most used techniques to inject faults
are clock glitching, power glitches, electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI)
and Optical fault injection.
Most of these attacks can be performed with inexpensive equipment in
comparison with invasive attacks and even with semi-invasive attacks.
Hence, non-invasive attacks are a major threat to devices security.
2.2 Fault Injection Techniques
As discussed, FI attacks are active side channel attacks. The main idea of fault
injection attacks is to deliberately put the device under stress by perturbing its
working conditions through different methods [4].
2.2.1 Clock Glitching
This perturbation model is based on a temporal and controlled overclocking
of the device. For devices supplied with an external clock, a maximum clock
frequency fmax is typically defined. The minimum period Tmin equals the re-
ciprocal of fmax. As long as the injected clock glitch period Tg >= Tmin, no
erroneous behavior can be observed, but if Tg < Tmin, the probability for ob-
serving an erroneous behavior increases. The reason for the faults is a timing
violation. Each combinational path in a circuit has a specific propagation delay
(TP ), which describes the time interval between changing the input and pro-
viding a valid output value. Registers at the output of the combinational logic
block sample the value, typically at the positive clock edge. A representation of
Figure 2: Simple representation of a typical digital path [5].
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Figure 3: Clock glitch example.
this is provided in Figure 2. If the positive clock edge arrives before the output
of the combinational logic has settled to a stable value due to a timing violation
enforced by a clock glitch (Tg < TP ), the registers store erroneous values leading
to faulty computations as a consequence [6].
For achieving this, a clock period such as Tg << Tmin < Tn is inserted,
with the intention that it causes a transient malfunction of the target as the
result of a critical path timing violation. The clock signal is usually generated
as described in Figure 3. Notice that after injecting a glitch, the following clock
period is reduced from Tn to Tn − Tg. However, given that Tg << Tn, this
post-glitch period does not affect the normal behavior of the target [7].
Obviously, these kind of attacks require access to the target device clock signal,
and modern microcontrollers usually synthesize different internal clock signals
for several domains from an external reference clock, so clock glitching is not
possible, at least in a non-invasive attack.
2.2.2 Voltage Glitching
This perturbation model is based on a temporal and controlled underpowering
of the device. Underpowering means to reduce the value of the supply voltage
of the attacked device below the minimum value the device is specified for.
Consider a simple CMOS inverter gate as shown in Figure 4. According to
[8], it is possible to recall the propagation delay tpLH (Equation 1) as a function
of the power supply by means of a first order analysis of the inverter dynamics:
tpLH =
CL[
2|Vth,p|
VDD−|Vth,p| + ln(3− 4
|Vth,p|
VDD
)]
µpCox
Wp
Lp
(VDD − |Vth,p|)
(1)
where VDD is the power supply voltage, CL the load capacitance, Vth,p the
PMOS threshold voltage, µp the holes mobility, Cox the gate oxyde capacitance
and (Wp/Lp) the aspect ratio of the PMOS. A similar equation for tpHL may be
derived from Equation 1 by substituting the parameters related to the inverter
NMOS transistor for those related to the PMOS. Note that tpHL and tpLH may
have different values. Hence, the data propagation time through the inverter
(and through any logic block) depends on the handled data: the propagation
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Figure 4: Inverter: architecture and waveforms.
time is data-dependent.
As stated by Equation 1 any decrease of VDD will induce an increase of
the propagation delay of the inverter. By extension, the data propagation time
through any logic block is increased as long as the IC is underpowered. Hence,
underpowering is a valid technique to achieve fault injection by violation of the
timing constraints [9]. Due to this fact, similar effects can be achieved when
glitching the clock signal and the supply voltage [6].
Voltage glitching attacks usually need minor modifications on the target
device [10], such as:
• Power cut: the target IC needs to be disconnected from the on-board
power supply, and then obtain control over the target voltage supply.
• Capacitance: the target capacitance impacts the effectiveness of the in-
jected glitch. Therefore, the capacitance is reduced to a minimum by
removing as many bypass capacitors as possible from the PCB.
Nevertheless, there are other characteristics present in modern devices that
prevent voltage glitching attacks, such as on-die voltage regulators, multiple
power domains and active countermeasures such as voltage sensors. The pres-
ence of regulators in the IC makes the attack drastically more difficult, as the
injected glitch becomes compensated by those regulators.
2.2.3 Electromagnetic Fault Injection
This perturbation model is based on a temporal and controlled electromagnetic
pulse over the device. By means of electromagnetic induction, the pulse induces
a current in the target. This current momentarily changes the voltages and logic
values of the internal gates, and this may lead to a computational fault in the
target [11].
Electromagnetic induction is caused by the interaction between electric fields
and magnetic fields, according to Ampere’s circuital law and the Maxwell-
Faraday equations. Alternating the polarity of a magnetic field in time causes
an electric field to be generated. The consequence of this is, if a varying mag-
netic field flux passes through a closed circuit, then a current is generated in
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Figure 5: Schematic view of a loop of electrical wire with a current I in clockwise
direction The current generates a magnetic field B and B′.
that circuit. Figure 5 shows a schematic view of the effect of a magnetic field
on a ring-shaped conductor. If the strength of the flux (i.e. number of B lines
crossing the loop area) is changed, then the current I in the ring will change
as well. If the polarity of the flux is changed then the direction of the current
is switched as well. Similarly, a varying magnetic field can be generated by
varying the current in a ring-shaped conductor [12].
The intensity of the magnetic field B generated at the center of a ring-shaped
conductor with radius R and constant current I can be calculated using Equation
2:
B =
µoµrI
4piR2
∮
dL =
µoµrI
4piR2
2piR =
µoµrI
2R
(2)
where µo is the magnetic permeability of vacuum and µr is the relative per-
meability of the material the loop is filled with. Homogeneously, the current
induced in a loop by a magnetic field B can be calculated using Maxwell-Faraday
Equation, described in Equation 3:
∮
δΣ
E dl = −
∫
Σ
∂B
∂t
dS (3)
where Σ is the surface bounded by the loop, with contour δΣ and E is the
electrical field. If we assume that the surface does not change (i.e. the conductor
loop geometry remains constant in time) we can rewrite Equation 3:∮
δΣ
E dl = − ∂
∂t
∫
Σ
B dS = − ∂
∂t
ΦB (4)
where ΦB is the value for the magnetic flux through Σ.
Equation 4 implies that an electric field can be injected in a closed circuit
by varying over time the magnetic flux traversing the surface identified by the
circuit itself, hence the time partial derivative term on the right side of the
Equation 4. The electric field generates a difference of potentials across differ-
ent parts of the circuit, which induces currents as the free charges move to follow
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Figure 6: Schematic view of a EMFI device. Black ring represents the coil and
gray plane represent the target surface. Black headed arrows represent magnetic
field, while white headed arrows represent currents.
the potential gradient. Equation 4 proves that the strength of the induced po-
tential gradient is dependent on the time-derivative of the magnetic flux, and
not only the absolute value of the flux itself.
Electromagnetic Fault Injection instruments are designed to provide very
sharp variations on the magnetic field B(t), so stronger currents and potential
gradients can be induced in the circuit. In order to use these effects to inject
faults, EMFI equipment usually is made of a varying current source that injects
an abrupt current pulse into a coil that is placed near the target device. Figure
6 shows a schematic representation of such equipment. This sudden current
pulse generates a varying magnetic field that is able to induce currents in any
closed loop of the device under the coil. The potential gradients may change a
transistor from off to on or vice-versa, depending on the type of transistor and
the polarity of the voltage glitch introduced (i.e. the inducted current direction,
which depends on the coil current direction) [13].
The voltage glitch will only switch the state of one P-channel and N-channel
transistor pair and therefore does not cause short circuit between VDD and
GND. Eventually, this change in the state can introduce computational faults,
resulting in a successfully injected fault. Figure 7 gives an example of a circuit
layout. The coil located above M2 induces voltage glitches separately in two
loops: the loop outlined in red (center) and the loop outlined in orange (far
right). Since the loop area in red is much bigger than that in orange, the loop
in red will get most effective glitch [14].
Nevertheless, the usual dimensions for EM probe coils are in the scale of
13
Figure 7: Circuit layout showing the available closed loops in the circuit (red
and orange) [14].
millimeters and are not comparable to the scale of the circuit, as the effective
coil area is much bigger than a single transistor pair. This means that the ef-
fects of EMFI are substantially macroscopic, usually affecting to bigger metallic
structures as long parallel buses.
Obviously, this makes EMFI attacks sensitive to location changes. The coil
is often placed into a XYZ stage in order to fine tune the coil position over the
target device. This sensitivity also gives these kind of attacks the essential ad-
vantage to an attacker of targeting a specific part of the IC, and leave the rest
unperturbed. This is desirable if detectors and countermeasures are present.
The main disadvantage is, then, knowing where the locations of interest are in
the whole of the IC surface. It is common to run scans all over the IC surface
to characterize its behavior when exposed to EM pulses and then extract con-
clusions, but those scans can take a long time.
2.2.4 Optical Fault Injection
This perturbation technique is based on the exposure of the IC semiconductor
to light, usually by means of a very focused laser beam. The laser photons
generate free electrons in the P-channel and N-channel of transistors and, as
a result, the conductivity of any transistor inside the laser spot increases and
transistors switch to on state. The laser located above M2 and M1 in Figure 8
changes the status of M1 or M2 or both, which depends on the laser wavelength
and pulse strength. A description of the relation between laser wavelength, en-
ergy and its effect on transistors is described in Figure 9. If conductance of
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Figure 8: Circuit layout showing an example of the affected transistors by a
laser beam in a optical FI [14].
both transistors of a P-channel and N-channel pair happens, it causes a short
circuit (i.e. latch-up effect because of the parasitic structures intrinsic to CMOS
technology) between VDD and GND that can damage the chip [14].
Optical FI almost always requires the target device to be heavily modified
using mechanical or chemical processes until the silicon parts of it become visi-
ble. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this means that Optical FI is a semi-
invasive active side-channel attack, instead of a non-invasive. Even considering
it, Optical FI is often used in security labs to assess the security capabilities of
a secure application IC.
2.3 Effects of Fault Injection
Once explained the techniques to inject faults in a target, the effect of those
faults should be discussed. When attempting to inject a fault, there are several
possible results:
• Unsuccessful glitch: the attack has no effect on the target and it behaves
normally. This means that the attack failed.
• Crash: The glitch affects the target but causing unstable behavior. In
some architectures this can mean a processor exception, where the target
is held in an infinite loop as a result of an exception handler.
• Reset: The glitch affects the target but causing a reset in the device.
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Figure 9: Relationship between laser wavelength, pulse energy and its effect in
transistors [15].
• Successful glitch: The glitch affects the target resulting in the expected
behavior the fault was meant to produce.
Also, we can classify the effects of the fault according to its duration in time:
• Transient: the effect only lasts while the perturbation is applied. E.g. a
fault that produces a wrong Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) result, but the
following results for the same ALU are correct, even without reseting the
device.
• Temporary: the effect lasts until next device reboot. E.g. a change in a
peripheral control register bit, that will only restore its original value after
a reset.
• Permanent: the effect lasts permanently. E.g. a corrupted writing opera-
tion into non-volatile memory, or any other physical change in the actual
device that may affect the target functionality and is not restored after a
reset.
2.3.1 Fault Models
There are many ways a fault can affect a target, as studied in previous works
such as [16], [17] or [18]. The different ways a fault may affect a device are
modeled into what is known in the literature as fault models.
Memory related: Memory can be viewed as consisting of two parts: mem-
ory itself and the memory bus. The task of the memory bus is to transport data
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and instructions to and from memory. The bus is usually composed of the data
and the address bus:
• Address bus: selects the memory location to read from or the memory
location to store to.
• Memory data bus: transports the data stored at these locations.
Both can fail independently of each other. If there is a fault on the data
bus, incorrect data are presented. If the address bus is glitched, the data pre-
sented will be correct but from/to the wrong location. Identifying which faults
occurred will be hard, especially if both occur at the same time.
Registers related: Registers are an important part of the execution. Tar-
get devices usually contain both special use registers and general purpose regis-
ters. They can be glitched mainly causing a static corruption on the contents.
Then, depending on the affected register it may lead to wrong results (e.g. a
general purpose register was corrupted and then used in an ALU instruction) or
to more sophisticated faults (e.g. corrupting the program counter register leads
to a corrupted jump, corrupting the stack pointer register leads to incorrect
data retrieving from the stack).
Instructions related: Instructions are commonly categorized into three
groups: flow control, memory operations and ALU operations. Flow control
operations include instructions like branch and jump. Memory operations ei-
ther store or load data from memory. Last, ALU operations are computational
operations. Instructions and the way they are executed are highly architecture
dependent. For example, in a Von Neumann architecture, instructions have a
four phases cycle for execution:
1. Fetch phase: in this phase the instruction is retrieved from memory. Here
memory related faults apply, as discussed in 2.3.1, so corrupted instruc-
tions can be fetched, leading to different instructions or even illegal in-
structions being fetched.
2. Decode phase: in this phase the fetched instruction gets decoded, assigning
meaning to the data retrieved. A fault in this phase changes the way
the instruction is decoded, leading to different instructions or even illegal
instructions being executed. Thus, it is very hard to distinguish this faults
from the fetch phase faults.
3. Execution phase: Once decoded, the instruction gets executed. Faults in-
troduced during the execution phase would manifest themselves by com-
puting an incorrect result.
4. Store phase: The store result phase of the instruction execution cycle
stores the result from the executed instruction in a register or memory. A
fault during this phase would manifest itself as a corrupted or un-updated
value being stored.
Corrupted instructions may transform themselves into illegal instructions,
causing a crash or reset; or may transform into legal (but different) instructions.
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Figure 10: Examples of instruction faults in ARM instruction set. Left column
is mnemonic assembly code, right column is the binary machine code related to
that instruction. Bits affected from a fault are showed in red [24].
The result of this depends on the effects of the fault into the instructions, and
goes from a mere change in the operands to a totally different instruction. Also,
instruction skipping may happen as a result of instruction corruption, as a given
instruction can be transformed by means of a fault into a useless instruction.
Figure 10 shows an example of these effects in ARM architecture instruction set.
These faults can have important effects in the code running in a device, such
as skipping a security check or providing a wrong result in a cryptographic oper-
ation. Fault attacks pose a serious threat in cryptographic systems and they can
be applied on a multitude of physical implementations of various cryptographic
algorithms like AES [19], DES [20], ECC [21], or RSA [22][23]. Differential Fault
Analysis are a set of techniques to extract the secrets from these cryptographic
algorithms injecting faults and recovering faulty results. Comparing these re-
sults with the correct result (i.e. non injected fault result) may lead to expose
the internal state of the algorithm primitives and therefore to expose the secret
key. It is also very common to override the debug interfaces settings in a given
target device by means of fault injection. In [1] it is described the process to
unlock the JTAG interface of several SoCs using fault injection.
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3 Methodology
In this section it will be described the experiments performed during the research
of this work.
3.1 Objectives
As introduced in Chapter 1, the objective of the experiments is to assess the
security of automotive systems using fault injection techniques. Previous works
regarding security in automotive hardware make use of FI to unlock access to
debug interfaces and then compromise the system [1]. The present work takes
a different approach: using the automotive diagnostic services built in modern
Electronic Controller Units (ECUs) as a attack vector instead. Furthermore,
previous works experiments are performed under laboratory conditions, com-
monly using a development board as targets, whereas the present work uses
commercially available ECUs as targets.
3.2 Targets
The experiments will have two different target ECUs. Both are known in au-
tomotive industries as ”instrument cluster” or ”dashboard”. This units are
responsible for giving the driver all kinds of information about the state of the
car. Some examples are the current speed, the engine RPMs or the current fuel
consumption and level. They also display information about the possible prob-
lems the car may have, known as Malfunction Indicator Lights (MIL). Figure
11 shows a generic dashboard ECU example.
For confidentiality reasons, the assembler of the ECUs and the manufacturer
of the target ICs are not disclosed. Both targets, from now referred to as ECU1
and ECU2 are from the same major automotive manufacturer, being ECU1
from B-segment 2010 model, while ECU2 is from a C-segment 2015 model1.
Both have very similar hardware, to the point of having microcontroller units
(MCUs) from the same manufacturer and within the same product family, but
from different generations: ECU1 has an older version of the MCU whereas
ECU2 is from a newer generation MCU.
As a side note, datasheets were found online for ECU1 but not for ECU2.
The information provided by the datasheet of the MCU for the ECU1 made
possible to modify and attempt voltage fault injection in this target. Unfortu-
nately the newer MCU in ECU2 is not pin compatible and therefore voltage
glitching becomes a more time-consuming task for this other target: it is needed
to reverse engineer the PCB, tracing all on-board power supply lines, then check
whether they are connected to the MCU or not, and finally do the modifications
needed. For this reason electromagnetic fault injection was used with ECU2.
1Vehicle segments are a car classification defined by the European Commision, each seg-
ment constituting distinct product markets. More details in https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Euro_Car_Segment
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Figure 11: Unassembled instrument cluster board example, with dials and a
large LCD screen.
The general architecture of both ECUs is basically the same: an MCU with
CAN peripherals, stepper motor control circuitry for the dial instruments, and
a liquid crystal display connected using a dedicated LCD controller.
3.3 Fault injection setup
This subsection is aimed to describe a generic setup for fault injection cam-
paigns. A fault injection setup needs several components:
• Target: target itself may need to be modified depending of the needing
of the experiment. Alongside with power cut and capacitance reduction
modifications (see Section 2.2.2), it is needed to get access to a communi-
cation interface (e.g. CAN bus, UART) and to a reset line or mechanism.
• Communication: it is needed a way of communication between the target
device and the setup controller. This communication interface is used for
preparing the target before the perturbation and receiving feedback from
the glitch effect. E.g. using an UART port to send a command to the
target and receive a response to that command: if the response is not
the usual, a fault was injected; if it is the usual, then the glitch did not
affect the target in any expected way. Note that a fault could still be
injected, but in a way that is not detectable or evident only by evaluating
the output response.
• Reset: glitching attempts very often end putting the target device into
a unrecoverable state (i.e. crash results, see Section 2.3), and a reset is
needed to set the device back to an usable state. It is also recommendable,
if possible, to perform a reset every time before a glitch attempt, to discard
any non-observable or non-evident fault that could have been injected in
the previous attempt. Unfortunately, some devices have a long boot time,
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Figure 12: Schematic view of a typical voltage fault injection setup.
and performing a reset before every glitch attempt is not feasible due to
the long time it adds to the campaign.
• Trigger: this is, perhaps, one of the most important parts in a FI setup.
The trigger allows to synchronize both the target and the glitching equip-
ment. A good and stable trigger makes much easier a FI campaign. For
characterization and other experiments it is common to use a GPIO port
to set a flag before the target starts running the operation under attack.
In other experiments this is not possible, so the trigger is then derived
from other parts of the setup, such as communication interface activity
or more advanced triggering based on side channel analysis and pattern
detection [25].
• FI and control equipment: different perturbation equipment is needed
depending on the fault injection technique used. For a voltage glitching
setup a controlled voltage source is needed, usually along with a buffer
amplifier (i.e. voltage follower). For EMFI setups a EM pulse generator
is needed.
Besides the perturbation equipment, a controller is needed. This controller
is the responsible for setting the perturbation parameters, arming the
target device (i.e. sending a command or request) and evaluating the
response.
Extra equipment can be used, such as an oscilloscope or other measurement
devices, to troubleshoot the rest of the setup. Figure 12 shows an example
of a typical fault injection setup. In this setup, Spider [26] is used as the
perturbation device, communication device and reset mechanism. Triggering
signal is generated by the target itself. A glitch amplifier (i.e. voltage follower
buffer) is also included. Finally, all the setup is controlled by a computer and
monitored using an oscilloscope.
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Figure 13: Example of voltage glitching measurements of clock signal (orange)
and voltage supply signal with two glitches (blue).
3.4 Perturbation parameters
Perturbations are described using what is known as perturbation parameters.
With these parameters, a perturbation can be modeled in terms of timing and
energy [10]:
• Glitch delay: The amount of time between the trigger is set and the
glitch is injected. This parameter makes triggering crucial, as an incorrect
timing in the perturbation can have drastic effects in the glitch result
when targeting an specific operation, and also to the reproducibility of
the perturbation.
• Glitch length: the amount of time the perturbation is applied to the target,
i.e. the amount of time the target is exposed to underpowering, EM pulse
or laser burst during the perturbation.
• Glitch amplitude: this models the intensity of the perturbation, i.e. how
many volts are dropped to underpower the target, or the intensity of the
EM pulse or laser burst the target is exposed to.
Figure 13 shows an example of voltage glitching signals with remarks on
its perturbation parameters. Note that when selecting voltage glitching per-
turbation parameters it is also possible to select the normal (i.e. unperturbed)
voltage. It is desirable to set this unperturbed voltage as low as possible (but
within operative values) to reduce the impact the capacity has in the glitch
timing. This is because glitch falling time depends on capacitance and voltage
difference. Like this, there are also other parameters specific to other FI tech-
niques, such as XYZ coordinate for EMFI or Optical FI.
These parameters also make a certain perturbation reproducible, given that
the rest of conditions are kept, e.g. the trigger is asserted at the same instant
every attempt, or the XYZ reference point has not changed.
3.5 Experimental setup
This subsection contains the description of the experimental setups for both
targets ECU1 and ECU2. Both setups are similar, but each target has been
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Figure 14: ECU1 MCU datasheet figure related to power supply pins.
evaluated using a different fault injection technique, as mentioned in Section
3.2.
3.5.1 ECU1
This dashboard was disassembled to expose the PCB and search information
about the main MCU in the board. The pinout for the ECU was easily found
online, with the location of the power supply and CAN bus pins in the main
header.
After identifying the MCU and its datasheet, its power supply pins are lo-
cated. Thus, voltage glitching is considered. This specific IC has on-die voltage
regulators, which adds complexity to the attack, but a workaround is made.
Figure 14 shows a capture from the ECU1 MCU datasheet. It shows the power
related pins and their function within the IC, and the presence of two internal
voltage regulators, Reg0 and Reg1. If a voltage glitch is to be injected through
pins VDD50 or VDD51 with the intention of causing a fault in the core block,
Reg0 would compensate the glitch. Instead, voltage glitches are injected using
REGC0 and REGC1 pins. These pins, originally intended to install decoupling
capacitors for the Reg0 output voltage, are directly connected to the core block,
allowing to bypass the on-die regulator. Furthermore, pins VDD50 and VDD51
were lifted (i.e. disconnected from the PCB), decoupling capacitors connected
to pins REGC0 and REGC1 were removed, and the needed power supply for the
core block (nominally 2.5V) was supplied using those pins. Also, using the data
provided by the datasheet, MCU reset pin is located and made accessible.
Note that there is no interest in modifying the pins associated with Reg1,
since this regulator is for peripherals and clock related circuitry and the target
is the core itself.
For communicating with the ECU, an extra board is used. It is a Arduino-
like custom board, based on a Atmel XMEGA 128A4 microcontroller with two
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Figure 15: Riscurino: Automotive-oriented MCU development board with Ar-
duino format.
Microchip MCP25625 CAN controllers connected using I2C. Figure 15 shows a
picture of the board. This board runs a program that translates commands from
its serial port to its CAN bus, and also asserts a pin when the last command
was sent. Since it is not possible to run custom code in ECU1 its impossible
to modify it to trigger our setup, so this other approach is taken. Algorithm 1
shows a pseudo-code representation of the main function running in the auxil-
iary board, embedding the communication and triggering.
As for FI equipment and control, Riscure commercial tools are used: Inspec-
tor [27] and VC-Glitcher [28]:
Inspector is the software backend for controlling the setup. It includes highly
customizable software-controlled trigger and perturbation parameters such as
glitch and pulse length, pulse repetition, and voltage level. The software presents
the results in a detailed log [27]. Figure 16 shows an example of an Inspector run
log, showing expected behavior (green), target resets (yellow), and unexpected
behavior (red), along with the glitch parameters that caused the result.
VC-Glitcher is the hardware used to provide an arbitrary voltage signal (in-
cluding glitches) to the target. It consists of a Field-Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) and Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC). The DAC is able to provide
an arbitrary voltage signal between -4 V and 4 V with a 4 nanosecond pulse
resolution. The voltage signal is used to provide power to the the MCU core
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Data: command list with N commands, received from UART
Result: response to Nth command
init platform;
foreach command in command list do CAN send command;
if command is last command then
assert trigger;
save response;
else
discard response;
end
UART send response;
;
Algorithm 1: Basic algorithm for communication and triggering from exper-
imental setup
Figure 16: Inspector log screen example for a FI campaign [28].
25
Figure 17: Conceptual overview of VC-Glitcher [28].
Figure 18: Schematic for ECU1 setup.
using a glitch amplifier (i.e. high bandwidth voltage follower amplifier) that can
output a current up to 1.5 A. It is also the responsible of asserting the reset line
for the whole setup [10][28]. Figure 17 shows a schematic view of the tool. Note
that the interfaces used for this setup are labeled as smart card ports, but it is
trivial to connect them to a embedded target.
Figure 18 shows an schematic view of the complete setup for ECU1. Figure
19 shows an actual photography of the setup.
3.5.2 ECU2
This dashboard was also disassembled to expose the PCB and search informa-
tion about the main MCU in the board. The pinout for the ECU was easily
found online, with the location of the power supply and CAN bus pins in the
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Figure 19: ECU1 complete setup.
main header.
ECU2 MCU is identified as a next generation model of ECU1 MCU, and
no datasheet is found available online. It could be possible to track every power
line in the PCB and, making some assumptions, modify the board for voltage
glitching. Nevertheless, the lack of documentation was too discouraging, so EM-
FI was used instead, since this fault injection technique does not require any
modification to the target.
This setup remains exactly the same in terms of triggering and communi-
cation as described in Section 3.5.1. Also for FI equipment and control, VC-
Glitcher and Inspector are still in use. The main difference is that, instead of
using the voltage output from VC-Glitcher to inject glitches in the power supply
of the target, we use the control outputs for using an EM Probe Station.
The EM-FI Probe Station is an electromagnetic probe that runs at 24VDC
input voltage, which is transformed into a maximum of 450V and 64A output
over the coil of the probe. It is capable of sending a 17 nanoseconds EM pulse
into a target with a time between pulses as small as 1 microsecond. The pulse
is capable of inducing voltages of up to -1.4V in the target device [14]. The
EM-FI Probe has a number of interchangeable probe tips, with the coil in ei-
ther a clockwise and counter-clockwise orientation. The tip used has a diameter
of 4 mm. Along with this, a XYZ stage for positioning the probe on top of the
target is used.
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Figure 20: Schematic for ECU2 setup.
As for the setup reset, since no reset line was found in the target, it is per-
formed using a solid state relay to disconnect the power supply voltage from
ECU2 and then connect it again, effectively restarting the target. This adds
some time between perturbation attempts, as some time is required for the on-
board power supply circuits peripherals to stabilize.
The glitching parameters for this setup have changed as well. While in ECU1
the parameters control underpower voltage and underpower duration time, in
this setup EM pulse energy (pulse duration is fixed) and, more important, XY
coordinates are controlled.
Figure 20 shows an schematic view of the complete setup for ECU1. Figure
21 shows an actual photography of the setup.
3.6 Characterization
In this subsection it is described the characterization process for both targets.
For the experiments, it is needed to first explore the diagnostic service run-
ning in the targets, and then characterize the targets’ profile when exposed to
perturbations.
3.6.1 Diagnostic Services
As already introduced in Section 1, the objective of the present work is to as-
sert the security of real automotive applications using fault injection techniques.
Common applications found in commercial ECUs are related to diagnostic ser-
vices. Both targets are examples of ECUs in nowadays automotive market
running a diagnostic services specification known as Unified Diagnostic Services
(UDS, from ISO 14229). Then, instead of using FI techniques to obtain access
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Figure 21: ECU2 complete setup.
for debug interfaces like other works as [1], the approach of this work is to ob-
tain the assets from the Unified Diagnostic Services application running in the
targets. For a more detailed description of ISO 14229, please refer to Appendix
A.
For this part of the characterization none of the targets were modified yet,
only powered up and connected to a computer using a CANUSB interface, a
CAN-to-USB commercial tool [29]. Using this simple setup it is possible to run
scanning scripts in the computer to gather information about the UDS server
running in the targets.
Firstly, it is needed to discover the CAN bus arbitration ID for the UDS
requests to be sent (i.e. the arbitration ID the UDS server is listening to).
For this purpose Caring Caribou is used. Caring Caribou is a recompilation of
scripts written in Python with an specific module which deals with discovering
diagnostic services [30]. For more information about Caring Caribou refer to
[31].
Listing 3 shows the running command and its output. Surprisingly, the re-
sults are the same for both targets, suggesting that the software running in both
of them could be very similar. Arbitration ID 0x700 functions as a broadcast
arbitration ID, to which every diagnostic service answers. In these targets, there
are two available servers listening to arbitration IDs 0x711 and 0x714 respec-
tively.
29
Now it is desirable to have a listing of every service available in those servers.
Listing 4 shows the running commands and results for discovering services avail-
able in both servers. Since the server listening to 0x714 has more services avail-
able, it becomes the target server for the rest of the experiments. Nevertheless,
according to the ISO 14229 services are sometimes available only under certain
session. Caring Caribou lacks the functionality for scanning session codes and
the services available in each session. For this, a custom scanning script was
made, based on pyvit [32] (formerly known as CANard [33]). pyvit is a toolkit
for interfacing with automotive hardware from Python. It aims to implement
common hardware interfaces and protocols used in the automotive systems.
A typical UDS operation starts with a client (i.e. tester that makes use of
the diagnostic services) sending a request to the server (i.e. part of an ECU
and that provides the diagnostic services) for a certain diagnostic service, iden-
tified by its service ID. The server then sends a response to the client, that can
be either positive, meaning that the requested operation was successful; or a
negative response, meaning that the request could not be fulfilled. Positive re-
sponses contain the result of the request, while negative responses contain a code
associated with the circumstances for which the operation was not performed.
The strategy behind the services scanner is really simple: send requests
increasing the service ID, with no sub-function nor parameters, and then obtain
the response. Then, depending on the negative response code it can be guessed
if that service ID is supported or not:
• Not supported: The negative response will have a negative response code
of 0x11 (serviceNotSupported).
• Supported: Positive responses or negative responses with any other nega-
tive response code different from 0x11.
Then, after obtaining a list of services, a list of session codes is needed.
Again, the strategy is simple: send request of DiagnosticSessionControl in-
creasing the sessionID parameter and evaluating the response code to guess if
the session code is supported or not. Appendix A.1 shows a detailed description
of the DiagnosticSessionControl service. If the response is positive, services
found to be supported in the previous scan are requested again, to check whether
they are supported or not in the current session code (i.e. negative response
code different from 0x7F (serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession).
Listing 5 shows the result of this custom scanning script. It is worth men-
tioning that the available services results match the results from Caring Caribou
services scan (i.e. Listing 4).
As introduced in Section 1, firmware extraction is a main concern in hard-
ware security, as the posterior analysis of the binary can expose even more vul-
nerabilities. For extracting the firmware from the targets, ReadMemoryByAddress
(Service ID 0x23) is the most suitable service, since it allows to recover the con-
tent of physical addresses. Appendix A.2 shows a detailed description of the
ReadMemoryByAddress service.
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The first step for using this service is being in a diagnosticSession in
which ReadMemoryByAddres is available. According to the scans performed,
diagnosticSession 0x4F has access to this service, so a diagnosticSessionControl
request with sessionID parameter set to 0x4F is sent, obtaining a positive re-
sponse. From this session it is possible to make ReadMemoryByAddres requests.
But after any read request for any portion of memory, the response is nega-
tive, with a negative response code of 0x33 (i.e. SecurityAccessDenied). This
means that the service is protected and a successful SecurityAccess request is
first needed to get to use ReadMemoryByAddress.
SecurityAccess service allows clients to authenticate and grants access to
different services with protected access, such as the service ReadMemoryByAddress.
This authentication is based on a challenge-response scheme. First a seed is re-
quested, then an algorithm known for both client and server transforms the seed.
This algorithm is not defined by the ISO 14229 standard, so manufacturers are
free to design and implement their own algorithm, which is usually confidential
and not publicly available. Last, the result from applying the challenge algo-
rithm to the seed is sent back to the server as a key in a new request. At the
server, if the key matches with the expected result, security access is granted to
the client. Every time a wrong key is entered a new seed is generated to avoid
brute-force attacks. Also, a new seed is generated every time the target is re-
seted. This protection mechanism are not required by the ISO 14229 standard,
so they are an implementation decision from the targets manufacturer. More
details about SecurityAccess service can be found in Appendix A.3.
SecurityAccess itself could be a target for an attacker. A successful glitch
at the right instant could bypass the key comparison instruction and grant
access to an attacker that does not know the challenge algorithm. For these
targets not the case: after 3 wrong keys, there is a timeout of 10 minutes until
the next authentication attempt. Moreover, this timeout is also run after every
boot as well (i.e. no authentication requests are possible within the first 10 min-
utes from power up), so the timeout cannot be avoided by resetting the target.
This timeout is described in the ISO 14229 standard, but it is not mandatory.
The vehicle manufacturer shall then select if the delay timer is supported or not.
Considering the options, the final approach is trying to glitch at the au-
thentication checking that happens in the server after a ReadMemoryByAddress
request. Again, a successful glitch at the right instant could bypass the authen-
tication status check instruction, posing as autheticated and therefore allowing
the ReadMemoryByAddress service execution. This would allow an attacker to
receive the memory content even when not authenticated.
3.6.2 FI characterization
Before attempting to glitch a target, it is customary to first obtain a set of
perturbation parameters that optimize the faults injection process. This pa-
rameters are obtained in an experimental way, running an example program
with predictable timing and result. For example, in [1] the authors approached
the FI characterization using two different experiments, both with predictable
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result and with a stable trigger signal:
• unroll experiment: a sequence of increment instructions is performed on
the same CPU register. This should produce a predictable final value in
the counter register. The final value of the register is sent over a serial
connection at the end of the sequence. A pseudo code version of this setup
is given in Listing 1. A successful glitch affects the value of the counter
register by altering the content of the register itself or by changing the
code flow and skipping one (or more) increment instruction(s).
• auth experiment: an if-statement determines the program flow, simulating
a situation where an authentication check is performed, as shown in Listing
2. A successful glitch affects the if-statement so the unintended branch
(i.e. send serial authenticated function call) is executed.
Listing 1: unroll scenario pseudocode [1]
trigger_up()
asm(add r1 #1)
asm(add r1 #1)
...
asm(add r1 #1)
asm(add r1 #1)
trigger_down()
send_serial(r1)
Listing 2: auth scenario pseudocode [1]
flag = 1
...
trigger_up()
if (flag == 0):
send_serial_authenticated()
else
send_serial_denied()
trigger_down()
The methodology used for finding the optimal parameters (i.e. those with
the highest success rate) involves running multiple FI campaigns. In each cam-
paign, thousands of glitches are attempted while varying the parameters within
a certain range. The initial FI campaign runs on very broad parameters. The
parameters of the successful glitches found are used to restrict the search range
in the next campaign and after few iterations of this process the optimal pa-
rameters are found.
It is not possible to run custom code in the target devices: programming
tools and documentation are missing, and even with those, the firmware that
is to be extracted would be erased from the targets if any experiment code is
flashed. Therefore, it is impossible to run experiments like unroll or auth.
The main problem behind this is the impossibility to obtain a trigger signal,
controlled and synchronized with the characterization experiment. In this case,
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other triggering mechanisms are used, such as triggering based on communica-
tion traffic events.
For triggering the setup the auxiliary board Riscurino is used. It sets the
trigger after sending the UDS ReadMemoryByAddress request, and clears the
trigger after receiving any response. Figure 22 shows DSO measurements over-
lapped over time for both the trigger line and CAN high line for ECU1. It can
be appreciated the time between the trigger asserting and the server response
transmission (second group of activity, near the measuring cursors). That pe-
riod is the whole time window for the glitch offset parameter. Similar behavior
was measured for ECU2 but with different timing values.
It is also worth mentioning that the persistence view of the scope shows jitter
in the response timing. This jitter is shown in the Figure 22 between the time
axis cursors, caused by variations in the timing between the trigger asserting
and the response transmission. This variations can have an origin in the target
firmware, which probably is based on a Real Time Operating System (RTOS)
solution with different scheduled tasks sharing the resources of the MCU. A
RTOS scheduler could explain the measured jitter. This jitter is an inconve-
nience in terms of reproducibility, as the relative time between the triggering
and the computation of the response is not constant and therefore there is a
limit for the glitch offset parameter narrowing.
For the rest of perturbation parameters, such as glitch voltage, glitch length
for ECU1 or pulse intensity for ECU2, broad but yet reasonable ranges were
defined. As for the XYZ coordinates in the case of ECU2, a squared scan area
was defined in the inner part of the package, focusing on the die location and
skipping the bonding wires area.
3.6.3 ECU1
For the first voltage glitching campaign the following perturbation parameters
are selected:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 783,79 µs and 1299,59 µs (515 µs wide)
• Glitch Voltage: Random within -1 V and -0.7 V (relative to VCC = 2.3V )
• Glitch Length: Random within 150 ns and 350 ns
After a small number of glitch attempts a successful glitch was injected. Fig-
ure 23 shows a plot of the results. Each dot in the plots represents a FI attempt,
and the color of the dot represents the result: no effect (green), restart or mute
(yellow) and successful glitch (red). The three different plots show all three
variable (i.e. randomized) parameters against each other. Note that the glitch
offset time window is about 515 µs, and each glitch offset step has a resolution
of 2 ns, so there is a great amount of possible values. It is not usual to extract
conclusions after such a small number of attempts, but with such a broad glitch
offset time window it is desirable to reduce it as soon as possible and not to
spend more attempts in parameter values that have no desired effect on the
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Figure 22: Trigger and CAN bus activity persistent measurement at ECU1.
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target. Therefore, it is considered that the optimal glitch offset parameter value
is more likely to be near the value of that single successful glitch.
The next experiment keeps all the parameters equal to the previous one, but
reducing the glitch offset time window to 9 µs wide and centered on the first
successful glitch offset value:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 1050 µs and 1059 µs (9 µs wide)
• Glitch Voltage: Random within -1 V and -0.7 V (relative to VCC = 2.3V )
• Glitch Length: Random within 150 ns and 350 ns
The results after almost 150k glitch attempts are shown in Figure 24. Addi-
tional colors such as cyan, magenta and orange shows unexpected, non-successful
responses. The final successful glitch rate is about 0.5%.
Figure 24 shows that there is a quasi-linear relation in the glitch energy pa-
rameters (i.e. glitch voltage times glitch time), and for reducing these parame-
ters a smaller area is selected, keeping in mind the mentioned linear relationship.
As for the glitch offset, glitches are rarely taking place past the 1055 µs value,
so a new and narrower time window is defined for the next experiment:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 1052 µs and 1055 µs (3 µs wide)
• Glitch Voltage: Random within -0.85 V and -0.8 V (relative to VCC =
2.3V )
• Glitch Length: Random within 250 ns and 274 ns
Figure 25 shows the results for the third and last experiment, which in less
than 15k glitch attempts achieved a successful glitch rate of 0.88%.
Table 1 show a summary of ECU1 experiments parameters and hit rate:
3.6.4 ECU2
For the first EM-FI experiment the following perturbation parameters are se-
lected:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 260 µs and 420 µs (160 µs wide)
• Glitch Power: Random within 25% and 55% of EM probe maximum power
• XY coordinates: defined a grid of 30x15 points over the inner part of the
IC.
Table 1: ECU1 experiments summary
# Glitch Offset Glitch Voltage Glitch Length Hit rate
1 [783.79, 1299.59] us [-1, -0.7] V [150, 350] ns N/A
2 [1050, 1059] us [-1, -0.7] V [150, 350] ns 0.50%
3 [1052, 1055] us [-0.85, -0.8 ] V [250, 274] ns 0.88%
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Figure 23: ECU1 first experiment results.
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Figure 24: ECU1 second experiment results.
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Figure 25: ECU1 second experiment results.
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This kind of experiments place the EMFI probe over each of the grid points
and emit a pulse with the specified (in this case, random) perturbation param-
eters. Figure 26 shows the results of the first EM-FI experiment. In more than
185k glitch attempts only 8 successful glitches were injected, due to a wide pa-
rameter space. These glitches are enough to detect a tendency for the glitch
offset parameter, as they appear to group in the plots.
For the next experiment a narrower glitch offset time window is configured,
also centered around the previous successful glitches offset value. The rest of
parameters remain unmodified:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 370 µs and 380 µs (10 µs wide)
• Glitch Power: Random within 25% and 55% of EM probe maximum power
• XY coordinates: defined a grid of 30x15 points over the inner part of the
IC.
There is a great increase of performance, as now the results are of 10 suc-
cessful glitches in 32k glitch attempts. This means obtaining about the same
successful glitches in 5 times less attempts. Figure 27 shows the result for the
second experiment. From the plotted results it is hard to figure what location
is more prone to inject faults, as the same results are obtained in different parts
of the IC. In order to increase even more the perturbation parameters’ perfor-
mance, a fixed point is selected for the next experiment instead of scanning all
the IC surface.
For the following experiments, a single point at the surface of the chip is
selected, located at the relative (X,Y ) coordinates (25862, 151680). This point
can be located in Figure 27 near the black arrow. The rest of parameters remain
unmodified:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 370 µs and 380 µs (10 µs wide)
• Glitch Power: Random within 25% and 55% of EM probe maximum power
• XY coordinates: Fixed at (X,Y ) = (25862, 151680).
As expected, the performance increase is even bigger. With a number of
attempts about 27k, the number of successful glitches is 50, raising the success
glitch rate to 0.18%. Figure 28 shows the results for the remaining two random
parameters (i.e. glitch power and glitch offset). From the plot it is evident that
any attempt with a glitch power over 40% is resulting in a reset or mute, so the
glitch power window is narrowed. Also, the glitch offset time window can be
reduced to fit the area with biggest concentration of successful glitches.
The fourth and last experiment then narrows both random parameters win-
dows, again with a fixed location over the target IC:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 376.8 µs and 379.5 µs (2.7 µs wide)
• Glitch Power: Random within 30% and 39% of EM probe maximum power
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Figure 26: ECU2 first experiment results.
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Figure 27: ECU2 second experiment results. The black arrow points the point
of interest for following experiments.
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Figure 28: ECU2 third experiment results.
Figure 29: ECU2 fourth experiment results.
• XY coordinates: Fixed at (X,Y ) = (25862, 151680).
The results for this experiment are shown in Figure 29. Now the successful
glitches are spread all over the perturbation parameters space. This last experi-
ment got 137k attempts with a success glitch rate around 1.14%. This is a great
increase on hit rate compared with the previous experiments.
Table 2 show a summary of ECU1 experiments parameters and hit rate.
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Table 2: ECU2 experiments summary
# Glitch Offset Glitch Power X steps Y steps Hit rate
1 [260, 420] us [25, 55] % 30 15 N/A
2 [370, 380] us [25, 55] % 30 15 0.31%
3 [370, 380] us [25, 55] % 1 1 0.18%
4 [376.8, 379.5] us [30, 39] % 1 1 1.14%
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4 Results
After the characterization experiments, two sets of perturbation parameters
with a high success glitch score are obtained (one for each target). These pa-
rameters are applied in a final experiment for extracting the firmware.
This experiment is identical to the characterization experiments, with the
only difference that now the response from the target is logged in the com-
puter in order to reconstruct the firmware binary, and the address for the
ReadMemoryByAddress request is incremented after each successful glitch. This
section collects the results of the firmware extraction attacks in both targets.
4.1 ECU1
For this target, the final perturbation parameters were as follow:
• VCC Voltage: 2.3 V
• Glitch Offset: Random within 1052 µs and 1055 µs (3 µs wide)
• Glitch Voltage: Random within -0.85 V and -0.8 V
• Glitch Length: Random within 250 ns and 274 ns
The firmware downloading experiment achieved a final successful glitch score
of about 3% after 3˜00k attempts.
A total of 512 KB were downloaded, corresponding to the IC flash memory
address space (0x000000 - 0x080000). The download was made at 63 bytes per
successful glitch, as the target device implementation of ReadMemoryByAddress
would only accept a addressAndLengthFormatIdentifier parameter value of
0x14 (i.e. one byte for memorySize parameter and 4 bytes for memoryAddress
parameter, refer to Appendix A.2 for details.) and a maximum memorySize pa-
rameter of 0x3F. The reasons behind this peculiar values may be related to the
security implications of implementing dynamic memory allocators, as a static
buffer for the implementation must be used, according to the MISRA C guide-
lines2. Moreover, the relatively small size of this static buffer may be due to the
target RAM limitations.
Once the entire firmware binary was downloaded and reconstructed, it was
disassembled and analyzed using IDA Pro, a commercial interactive disassem-
bler. IDA performs automatic code analysis, using cross-references between
code sections and other information. However, the process of reverse engineer
an executable binary requires of human intervention, so IDA has interactive
functionality to aid in improving the disassembly. A typical IDA user will begin
with an automatically generated disassembly listing and then convert sections
of the binary into code or data, rename, annotate and add information to the
listing, until it becomes clear what the binary does [34].
2MISRA C is a set of guidelines and best practices for developing C code for safety-related
applications in critical systems. More details at https://www.misra.org.uk/Activities/
MISRAC/tabid/160/Default.aspx
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With the help of Riscure security analysts experienced in binary reverse engi-
neering it was possible to locate the routine responsible for the SecurityAccess
authentication. The algorithm used for transforming the seed into the key
was extracted, implemented in the testing computer and later verified with a
SecurityAccess request. The response to that request was positive, meaning
that the correct algorithm was obtained and from now on it is possible to au-
thenticate and perform more advanced requests, posing as an authorized testing
user.
4.2 ECU2
For this target, the final perturbation parameters were as follow:
• Glitch Offset: Random within 376.8 µs and 379.5 µs (2.7 µs wide)
• Glitch Power: Random within 30% and 39% of EM probe maximum power
• XY coordinates: Fixed at (X,Y ) = (25862, 151680).
The firmware downloading experiment achieved a final successful glitch score
of about 1.7% after 5˜00k attempts.
This target ReadMemoryByAddress implementation was more flexible, al-
lowing a addressAndLengthFormatIdentifier parameter value of 0x23 and
an arbitrary value for memorySize parameter. There was an attempt of setting
a value for memorySize parameter to 0xFFFF but with such a big value the per-
turbation parameters were no longer adequate and any successful glitch was ob-
tained, most probably due to a change in the request handler timing introduced
by such a big memorySize parameter. After some tries, memorySize parameter
was set to 0x01FF, obtaining 511 bytes per successful glitch. According to IC
manufacturer website the target has 3 MB of flash memory, and the experi-
ment downloaded its entire memory address space (0x000000 - 0x300000). It
is worth mentioning that this address space is determined by an educated guess,
since no datasheet is available for this target.
The resulting binary firmware was also disassembled and analyzed using IDA
Pro. Some efforts in finding the SecurityAccess authentication routine were
made without success. The big size of the binary makes the analysis tedious
and time consuming, and it is left for future work. Even without finding the
required authentication algorithm, the device is to be considered compromised,
as the firmware is already extracted.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
The present work has shown that, without the proper countermeasures, a given
ECU could be target of a non-invasive, active side channel attack and be com-
promised with relative easiness.
As shown in Section 4, both targets were compromised extracting the run-
ning firmware by means of fault injection techniques. Section 1 describes the
risks and possible consequences that could follow to an attack such as the per-
formed in the present work. Moreover, Section 4.1 shows that the analysis of the
extracted firmware running in ECU1 allowed to obtain the needed credentials
that give security access to the device, in a way that fault injection is no longer
needed. This makes the rest of threats easier to accomplish, as an attacker could
patch the firmware safely using UDS services such as WriteMemoryByAddress
or RequestDownload and run arbitrary code in the device.
5.1 Countermeasures
For protecting the devices against fault injection attacks, there exist counter-
measures that makes a fault injection attack much harder or even unfeasible.
These countermeasures can be built in hardware or implemented in software.
When any of the countermeasures detect a fault injection attempt, a reaction
is to be made, usually a hardware reset or a interruption that triggers other
actions.
5.1.1 Hardware
There are many ways to protect a circuit against fault injection techniques,
active and passive protections [35]. Some active protection examples are the
following:
• Supply voltage detectors: react to abrupt variations in the applied poten-
tial and continuously ascertain that voltage is within the circuit tolerance
thresholds, to detect voltage glitching.
• Hardware redundancy: redundancy of hardware blocks (or a single block
processing the operation multiple times) followed by a test by a compara-
tor. When different results don’t match, a reaction is made.
• Light detectors: detect changes in the gradient of light, in order to detect
optical fault injection attacks.
• Frequency detectors: impose an interval of operation outside which the
electronic circuit will reset itself, to detect clock glitching.
• Active shields: metal meshes that cover the entire chip and has data pass-
ing continuously in them. If there is a disconnection or modification of this
mesh the chip will not operate anymore. This is primarily a countermea-
sure against probing, although it helps protecting against fault injection
as it makes the location of specific blocks in a circuit harder
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The second class of hardware protection mechanisms consists of passive pro-
tections that increase the difficulty of successfully attacking a device:
• Mechanisms that introduce dummy random cycles (i.e. random delays)
during code processing. This effectively causes jitter, making triggering
and obtaining timing perturbation parameters much harder.
• Passive shield: a full metal layer covers some sensitive chip parts, which
makes light or electromagnetic pulse attacks more difficult as the shield
needs to be removed before the attack can proceed.
• Unstable internal frequency generators: protect against attacks that need
to be synchronized with a certain event, as events occur at different mo-
ments in different executions generating again artificial jitter.
5.1.2 Software
This countermeasures are implemented when hardware countermeasures are in-
sufficient or as cautious protection against future attack techniques that might
defeat present-generation hardware countermeasures. The advantage of software
countermeasures is that they do not increase the hardware block size, although
they do impact the protected functions’ execution time. Some examples of soft-
ware countermeasures are the following:
• Checksums and integrity checks: this mechanisms can be implemented
in software, often complementary to hardware checksums. Software CRCs
can be applied to buffers of data (sometimes fragmented over various phys-
ical addresses) rather than machine words.
• Software redundancy: as hardware redundancy, it consists in performing
the same operations several times and comparing the results to verify
that the correct result is generated. This redundancy is more secure if the
following calculations are different (e.g. encrypt-decrypt-encrypt, sign-
verify) than the first so that the same fault cannot be used at different
times. Also, it is desirable to limit compiler optimizations, as sometimes
redundant source code is optimized by them.
• Use non-trivial values for constant values if possible, preferably with maxi-
mal hamming distance. Boolean and simple data values are easy to manip-
ulate, as bit flipping is one of the most common effects of fault injection.
This reduces the chances of matching a non trivial value using FI.
5.2 Future work
This work leaves several open questions that are interesting for future work:
• Perform similar experiments with newer ECUs (late 2016 or later) and
assess the security of modern automotive systems using fault injection
techniques, specially if the MCU built in the targets has ASIL-D certifi-
cation [1].
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• Continue with the extracted firmware analysis. Reverse engineering the
extracted binaries could reveal additional security vulnerabilities that could
be used to compromise the targets without using FI. Additionally, these
vulnerabilities need to be evaluated in case that they can be used for at-
tack escalation, i.e. extending the attack from the compromised target to
others devices in the same network.
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A ISO 14229: Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS)
ISO 14229 specifies data link independent requirements of diagnostic services,
which allow a diagnostic tester (client) to control diagnostic functions in an
on-vehicle Electronic Control Unit (server) such as an electronic fuel injection,
automatic gear box, anti-lock braking system, etc. connected on a serial data
link embedded in a road vehicle. It also specifies generic services which al-
low the diagnostic tester (client) to stop or to resume non-diagnostic message
transmission on the data link. ISO 14229 does not, by itself, specify any imple-
mentation requirements [36]. Nevertheless, the target ECUs mentioned in the
present work follow the ISO 14229-3 implementation requirements. These spec-
ifications, known as UDSonCAN, detail the implementation of a common set of
unified diagnostic services (UDS), in accordance with ISO 14229, on controller
area networks (CAN) as specified in ISO 11898 [37].
This standard describes, among other specifications and requirements, a set
of diagnostic services to perform functions such as test, inspection, monitoring
or diagnosis of on-board vehicle servers. The client uses these services to re-
quest diagnostic functions to be performed in one or more servers. The server,
usually a function that is part of an ECU, uses the services to send response
data, provided by the requested diagnostic service, back to the client.
In the situation that a request is not valid (e.g. bad request format, unau-
thorized client or service not supported) the server answers with a negative
response, containing a Negative Response Code (NRC). Table 3 defines some of
the most common negative response codes used within ISO 14229. More NRCs
exist in the specification [36], but are not included in the table for the sake of
brevity. Each diagnostic service specifies applicable negative response codes but
the diagnostic service implementation in the server may also use additional and
applicable negative response codes specified in the standard.
Table 4 collects the Service ID and description for all the services found in
the targets used for this work. More services exist in the ISO 14229 specification
[36], but are not included in the table for the sake of brevity.
A.1 DiagnosticSessionControl
The DiagnosticSessionControl service is used to enable different diagnostic ses-
sions in the server. A diagnostic session enables a specific set of diagnostic
services and/or functionality in the server. There shall always be exactly one
diagnostic session active in a server. A server shall always start the default di-
agnostic session when powered up. If no other diagnostic session is started, then
the default diagnostic session shall be running as long as the server is powered.
Any non-defaultSession is tied to a diagnostic session timer that has to be kept
active by the client using the service TesterPresent.
Figure 30 shows the service request format definition. More details can be
found in Section 9.2 of [36].
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Figure 30: DiagnosticSessionControl request message definition [36].
Figure 31: ReadMemoryByAddress request message definition [36].
A.2 ReadMemoryByAddress
The ReadMemoryByAddress service allows the client to request memory data
from the server via a provided starting address and to specify the size of mem-
ory to be read. The ReadMemoryByAddress request message is used to request
memory data from the server identified by the parameter memoryAddress and
memorySize. The number of bytes used for the memoryAddress and memory-
Size parameter is defined by addressAndLengthFormatIdentifier (low and high
nibble).
Figure 31 shows the service request format definition. The server sends data
record values via the ReadMemoryByAddress positive response message. More
details can be found in Section 10.3 of [36].
A.3 SecurityAccess
The purpose of this service is to provide a means to access data and/or di-
agnostic services which have restricted access for security, emissions or safety
reasons. Diagnostic services for downloading/uploading routines or data into a
server and reading specific memory locations from a server are situations where
security access may be required. Improper routines or data downloaded into
a server could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle components
or risk the vehicle’s compliance to emissions, safety or security standards. The
security concept uses a seed and key relationship.
A typical example of the use of this service is as follows:
1. Client requests the seed: The client shall request the server to “unlock”
by sending the service SecurityAccess “requestSeed” message.
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Figure 32: SecurityAccess requestSeed request message definition [36].
Figure 33: SecurityAccess sendKey request message definition [36].
2. Server sends the “seed”: The server shall respond by sending a “seed”
using the service SecurityAccess “requestSeed” positive response message.
3. Client sends the “key”: The client shall then respond by returning a “key”
number (appropriate for the Seed received) back to the server using the
appropriate service SecurityAccess “sendKey” request message.
4. Server compares the ”key”: The server shall compare this “key” to one
internally stored/calculated. If the two numbers match, then the server
shall enable (“unlock”) the client’s access to specific services/data and
indicate that with the service SecurityAccess “sendKey” positive response
message. If the two numbers do not match, this shall be considered a false
access attempt.
A vehicle-manufacturer-specific time delay may be required before the server
can positively respond to a service SecurityAccess “requestSeed” message from
the client after server power up/reset and after a certain number of false access
attempts.
Figures 32 and 33 shows the service ”requestSeed” and ”sendKey” requests
format definition, respectively. More details can be found in Section 9.4 of [36].
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Table 3: Common UDS Negative Response Codes [30].
Hex Abbreviation Description
0x10 GR General reject
0x11 SNS Service not supported
0x12 SFNS Subfunction not supported
0x13 IMLOIF Incorrect message length or invalid format
0x14 RTL Response too long
0x21 BRR Busy repeat request
0x22 CNC Condition not correct
0x24 RSE Request sequence error
0x25 NRFSC No response from subnet component
0x26 FPEORA Failure prevents execution of requested action
0x31 ROOR Request out of range
0x33 SAD Security access denied
0x35 IK Invalid key
0x36 ENOA Exceeded number of attempts
0x37 RTDNE Required time delay not expired
0x38-0x4F RBEDLSD Reserved by extended data link security doc-
ument
0x70 UDNA Upload/download not accepted
0x71 TDS Transfer data suspended
0x72 GPF General programming failure
0x73 WBSC Wrong block sequence counter
0x78 RCRRP Request correctly received but response is
pending
0x7E SFNSIAS Subfunction not supported in active session
0x7F SNSIAS Service not supported in active session
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Table 4: Services implemented in the targets
Service ID Service Description
0x10 DiagnosticSessionControl Described in Appendix A.1.
0x14 ClearDiagnosticInformation Clear any stored DTC and additional infor-
mation.
0x19 ReadDTCInformation Read any stored DTC and additional informa-
tion.
0x22 ReadDataByIdentifier Retrieve one or more data record from the
server, each record identified by a 2 bytes
dataIdentifier or DID.
0x23 ReadMemoryByAddress Described in Appendix A.2.
0x27 SecurityAccess Described in Appendix A.3.
0x28 CommunicationControl Switch on/off the transmission and/or the re-
ception of certain messages of the server.
0x2E WriteDataByIdentifier Writing counterpart for ReadDataByIdenti-
fier.
0x2F InputOutputControlByIdentifier Allows an external system intervention on in-
ternal/external signals via the diagnostic in-
terface.
0x31 RoutineControl Allows to request to start, stop a routine in
the server or request the routine results.
0x34 RequestDownload Used by the client to initiate a data transfer
from the client to the server (download)
0x36 TransferData Used by the client to transfer data either from
the client to the server (download) or from the
server to the client (upload).
0x37 RequestTransferExit Used by the client to terminate a data trans-
fer between client and server (upload or down-
load)
0x3D WriteMemoryByAddress Writing counterpart for ReadMemoryByAd-
dress.
0x3E TesterPresent Used to indicate to the server that a client
is still connected to the vehicle and that cer-
tain diagnostic services and/or communica-
tions that have been previously activated are
to remain active
0x85 ControlDTCSetting Enable or disable the detection of any or all
DTC.
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B Listings
Listing 3: Running CC UDS discovery module
quorth@archie ~/dev/caringcaribou/tool (git)-[master] % python2
↪→ cc.py dcm discovery -nostop
-------------------
CARING CARIBOU v0.1
-------------------
Loaded module ’dcm’
Starting diagnostics service discovery
Sending Diagnostic Session Control to 0x0700
Found diagnostics at arbitration ID 0x0700, reply at 0x077b
Found diagnostics at arbitration ID 0x0700, reply at 0x077e
Sending Diagnostic Session Control to 0x0711
Found diagnostics at arbitration ID 0x0711, reply at 0x077b
Sending Diagnostic Session Control to 0x0714
Found diagnostics at arbitration ID 0x0714, reply at 0x077e
Bruteforce of range 0x0-0x7ff completed
Listing 4: Running CC UDS services module
quorth@archie ~/dev/caringcaribou/tool (git)-[master] % python2
↪→ cc.py dcm services 0x711 0x77b
-------------------
CARING CARIBOU v0.1
-------------------
Loaded module ’dcm’
Starting DCM service discovery
Supported service 0x10: DIAGNOSTIC_SESSION_CONTROL
Supported service 0x14: CLEAR_DIAGNOSTIC_INFORMATION
Supported service 0x19: READ_DTC_INFORMATION
Supported service 0x22: READ_DATA_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x23: READ_MEMORY_BY_ADDRESS
Supported service 0x27: SECURITY_ACCESS
Supported service 0x28: COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
Supported service 0x2e: WRITE_DATA_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x2f: INPUT_OUTPUT_CONTROL_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x3d: WRITE_MEMORY_BY_ADDRESS
Supported service 0x3e: TESTER_PRESENT
Supported service 0x85: CONTROL_DTC_SETTING
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quorth@archie ~/dev/caringcaribou/tool (git)-[master] % python2
↪→ cc.py dcm services 0x714 0x77e
-------------------
CARING CARIBOU v0.1
-------------------
Loaded module ’dcm’
Supported service 0x10: DIAGNOSTIC_SESSION_CONTROL
Supported service 0x11: ECU_RESET
Supported service 0x14: CLEAR_DIAGNOSTIC_INFORMATION
Supported service 0x19: READ_DTC_INFORMATION
Supported service 0x22: READ_DATA_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x23: READ_MEMORY_BY_ADDRESS
Supported service 0x27: SECURITY_ACCESS
Supported service 0x28: COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
Supported service 0x2e: WRITE_DATA_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x2f: INPUT_OUTPUT_CONTROL_BY_IDENTIFIER
Supported service 0x31: ROUTINE_CONTROL
Supported service 0x34: REQUEST_DOWNLOAD
Supported service 0x36: TRANSFER_DATA
Supported service 0x37: REQUEST_TRANSFER_EXIT
Supported service 0x3d: WRITE_MEMORY_BY_ADDRESS
Supported service 0x3e: TESTER_PRESENT
Supported service 0x85: CONTROL_DTC_SETTING
Listing 5: Results of sessions and services custom scanner script
Service 0x10 found: DiagnosticSessionControl
Service 0x11 found: ECUReset
Service 0x14 found: ClearDiagnosticInformation
Service 0x19 found: ReadDTCInformation
Service 0x22 found: ReadDataByIdentifier
Service 0x23 found: ReadMemoryByAddress
Service 0x27 found: SecurityAccess
Service 0x28 found: CommunicationControl
Service 0x2E found: WriteDataByIdentifier
Service 0x2F found: InputOutputControlByIdentifier
Service 0x31 found: RoutineControl
Service 0x34 found: RequestDownload
Service 0x36 found: TransferData
Service 0x37 found: RequestTransferExit
Service 0x3D found: WriteMemoryByAddress
Service 0x3E found: TesterPresent
Service 0x85 found: ControlDTCSetting
Session 0x01 available, code 0x00: positiveResponse
Session 0x02 available, code 0x7E:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupportedInActiveSession
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Session 0x03 available, code 0x00: positiveResponse
Session 0x40 available, code 0x00: positiveResponse
Session 0x4F available, code 0x00: positiveResponse
Session 0x60 available, code 0x00: positiveResponse
(!!) Timeout in session 0x81
Session 0x82 available, code 0x7E:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupportedInActiveSession
(!!) Timeout in session 0x83
(!!) Timeout in session 0xC0
(!!) Timeout in session 0xCF
(!!) Timeout in session 0xE0
Evaluating available services in session 0x01
Service 0x10 (DiagnosticSessionControl) positive response
Service 0x11 (ECUReset) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x14 (ClearDiagnosticInformation) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x19 (ReadDTCInformation) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x22 (ReadDataByIdentifier)
Service 0x23 (ReadMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x27 (SecurityAccess) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x28 (CommunicationControl) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x2E (WriteDataByIdentifier) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2F (InputOutputControlByIdentifier) response 0
↪→ x13: incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x31 (RoutineControl) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x34 (RequestDownload) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x36 (TransferData) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x37 (RequestTransferExit) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x3D (WriteMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x3E (TesterPresent)
Service 0x85 (ControlDTCSetting) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Evaluating available services in session 0x02
Not able to enter to session 0x02 from extendedDiagnosticSession,
↪→ received code 0x78 (responsePending), skipping...
Evaluating available services in session 0x03
Service 0x10 (DiagnosticSessionControl) positive response
Service 0x11 (ECUReset) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
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Service 0x14 (ClearDiagnosticInformation) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x19 (ReadDTCInformation) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x22 (ReadDataByIdentifier)
Service 0x23 (ReadMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x27 (SecurityAccess) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x28 (CommunicationControl) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2E (WriteDataByIdentifier) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2F (InputOutputControlByIdentifier) response 0
↪→ x13: incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x31 (RoutineControl) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x34 (RequestDownload) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x36 (TransferData) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x37 (RequestTransferExit) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x3D (WriteMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x3E (TesterPresent)
Service 0x85 (ControlDTCSetting) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Evaluating available services in session 0x40
Service 0x10 (DiagnosticSessionControl) positive response
Service 0x11 (ECUReset) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x14 (ClearDiagnosticInformation) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x19 (ReadDTCInformation) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x22 (ReadDataByIdentifier)
Service 0x23 (ReadMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
Service 0x27 (SecurityAccess) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x28 (CommunicationControl) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2E (WriteDataByIdentifier) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2F (InputOutputControlByIdentifier) response 0
↪→ x13: incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x31 (RoutineControl) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x34 (RequestDownload) response 0x13:
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↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x36 (TransferData) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x37 (RequestTransferExit) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x3D (WriteMemoryByAddress) response 0x7F:
↪→ serviceNotSupportedInActiveSession
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x3E (TesterPresent)
Service 0x85 (ControlDTCSetting) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Evaluating available services in session 0x4F
Service 0x10 (DiagnosticSessionControl) positive response
Service 0x11 (ECUReset) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x14 (ClearDiagnosticInformation) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x19 (ReadDTCInformation) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x22 (ReadDataByIdentifier)
Service 0x23 (ReadMemoryByAddress) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x27 (SecurityAccess) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x28 (CommunicationControl) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2E (WriteDataByIdentifier) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2F (InputOutputControlByIdentifier) response 0
↪→ x13: incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x31 (RoutineControl) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x34 (RequestDownload) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x36 (TransferData) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x37 (RequestTransferExit) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x3D (WriteMemoryByAddress) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x3E (TesterPresent)
Service 0x85 (ControlDTCSetting) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Evaluating available services in session 0x60
Service 0x10 (DiagnosticSessionControl) positive response
Service 0x11 (ECUReset) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x14 (ClearDiagnosticInformation) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x19 (ReadDTCInformation) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
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(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x22 (ReadDataByIdentifier)
Service 0x23 (ReadMemoryByAddress) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x27 (SecurityAccess) response 0x12:
↪→ subFunctionNotSupported
Service 0x28 (CommunicationControl) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2E (WriteDataByIdentifier) response 0x31:
↪→ requestOutOfRange
Service 0x2F (InputOutputControlByIdentifier) response 0
↪→ x13: incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x31 (RoutineControl) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x34 (RequestDownload) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Service 0x36 (TransferData) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x37 (RequestTransferExit) response 0x33:
↪→ securityAccessDenied
Service 0x3D (WriteMemoryByAddress) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
(!!) Timeout in serviceTry 0x3E (TesterPresent)
Service 0x85 (ControlDTCSetting) response 0x13:
↪→ incorrectMessageLengthOrInvalidFormat
Evaluating available services in session 0x82
Not able to enter to session 0x82 from extendedDiagnosticSession,
↪→ received code 0x78 (responsePending), skipping...
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Acronyms
ALU Arithmetic Logic Unit.
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level.
CAN Controller Area Network.
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DSO Digital Signal Oscilloscope.
DTC Diagnostic Trouble Code.
ECU Electronic Control Unit.
EMFI ElectroMagnetic Fault Injection.
FI Fault Injection.
GPIO General Purpose Input/Output.
IC Integrated Circuit.
MCU MicroController Unit.
NRC Negative Response Code.
PCB Printed Circuit Board.
RTOS Real Time Operating System.
SCA Side Channel Analysis.
SoC System on Chip.
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter.
UDS Unified Diagnostic Services.
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